Thursday, April 24, 2025

 # Appendices – From Prophethood to Caliphate: Supporting Evidence and Modern Continuity


These appendices provide the foundational sources, legal doctrines, and modern institutions that confirm the unbroken continuity between Muhammad’s war doctrine and its application across Islamic empires and into the modern era.


## Appendix I: Classical Sources Proving Muhammad’s War Doctrine Was Law


### 1. *Reliance of the Traveller* (‘Umdat al-Salik) – Shafi‘i Manual of Islamic Law

- **Jihad as Obligation**: “Jihad is a communal obligation... to make war on non-Muslims.” (o9.1–9.9)

- **Apostasy = Death**: “When a sane adult voluntarily apostatizes from Islam, he deserves to be killed.” (o8.1)

- **Dhimmi Status**: Non-Muslims must be humiliated, restricted, and taxed. (o11.1–11.11)


### 2. *Al-Muwatta* of Malik – Foundational Maliki Manual

- “Captured women may be taken as concubines.” (Book 21, Hadith 3)

- “Umar imposed humiliation with the jizya on the People of the Book.” (Book 17, Hadith 4)


### 3. *Risala* by Al-Shafi‘i – Sourcebook of Shafi‘i Legal Reasoning

- “Everything the Prophet commanded is legally binding.” (§289–291)

- Cites Qur’an 9:29 directly to mandate jihad against non-Muslims until they submit.


### 4. *Al-Ahkam al-Sultaniyya* by Al-Mawardi – Abbasid Governance Manual

- “The Imam must prepare armies and wage jihad against those who resist Islam.”

- Dhimmis must be subdued and shown contempt to reinforce Islamic dominance.


## Appendix II: Modern Jihadists and Classical Legal Roots


Modern Islamist movements and jihadist ideologues do not operate in a vacuum. Their doctrines, strategies, and justifications are rooted in **centuries-old Islamic jurisprudence**. Far from distorting Islam, they resurrect its classical legal mandates.


### πŸ”₯ 1. Sayyid Qutb (d. 1966) – *Milestones* (Ma‘alim fi’l-Tariq)

- Rejected the idea that jihad is only defensive.

- Advocated permanent revolution to destroy non-Islamic systems.

- Quoted Qur’an 9:29 and classical jurists like Ibn Taymiyyah.

- Used terms like *jahiliyya* (state of ignorance) to describe modern secular states as valid jihad targets.


### ⚔️ 2. Abul A‘la Mawdudi (d. 1979) – *Jihad in Islam*

- Called Islam a political revolution aimed at global dominance.

- Defined jihad as a struggle to seize power and establish Sharia.

- Quoted classical fiqh: Mawardi’s *Al-Ahkam al-Sultaniyya*, Shafi‘i rulings, and Qur’an 9:5.


### πŸ’£ 3. Osama bin Laden (d. 2011) – *1996 Declaration of War Against the Americans*

- Justified the killing of civilians using Qur’an 9:5 and 2:191.

- Referenced Bukhari, Ibn Taymiyyah, and *Al-Muwatta*.

- Called jihad an individual obligation (fard ‘ayn) in response to “occupation.”


### 🧠 4. Ayman al-Zawahiri (d. 2022) – *Knights Under the Prophet’s Banner*

- Claimed jihad is not for justice but to implement Sharia.

- Used Shafi‘i and Hanbali legal texts.

- Cited *Reliance of the Traveller* to affirm jihad as both a communal and individual duty.


### 🏴‍☠️ 5. ISIS – *Dabiq* Magazine (Official Propaganda)

- Declared reestablishment of the Caliphate.

- Reimplemented jizya, sex slavery, and apostasy executions.

- Cited Ibn Kathir, Mawardi, and Hanbali rulings for justification.


**Bottom Line**: These jihadists are not inventing a new Islam. They are deploying the old one—exactly as it was written by classical jurists. Their terror is not a deviation from doctrine—it is **doctrine in action**.


## Appendix III: How Classical Jihad Lives On in Islamic Education


The doctrines of jihad, dhimmitude, apostasy laws, and Islamic supremacism are not relics of the past—they are still **taught, preserved, and promoted** in mainstream Islamic educational institutions across the world.


### πŸ•Œ 1. Al-Azhar University (Cairo, Egypt)

- Known as the “Vatican of Sunni Islam.”

- Curricula include: *Al-Muwatta*, *Risala*, *Reliance of the Traveller*.

- 2009 fatwa from Dar al-Ifta affirmed: “Waging jihad against non-Muslims to spread Islam is a legitimate part of Islamic law.”

- Courses in **Siyar (Islamic war jurisprudence)** reinforce the **Dar al-Islam vs. Dar al-Harb** paradigm.


### πŸ“š 2. Pakistani Madrassas (Deobandi & Barelvi Sects)

- Core curriculum: **Dars-e-Nizami**, used in thousands of madrassas.

- Key texts:

  - *Hidayah* (Hanafi): “Jihad is obligatory at least once every year.”

  - *Minhaj al-Talibin* (Shafi‘i): “The caliph fights those who refuse Islam or jizya...”

- Many Taliban leaders and jihadist groups are alumni.

- Notably, **Darul Uloom Haqqania** is nicknamed the “University of Jihad.”


### πŸ‡ΈπŸ‡¦ 3. Saudi Arabia: Wahhabi Curriculum

- Pre-2019 state education endorsed offensive jihad and takfir.

- Taught:

  - *Majmu‘ al-Fatawa* (Ibn Taymiyyah)

  - *Kitab al-Tawhid* (Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab)

- Interpreted Qur’an 9:5 as a **general command to fight until Islam dominates**.


### πŸŽ“ 4. Islamic Universities (Medina & Umm al-Qura)

- Produce global clerics trained in Wahhabi/Salafi ideology.

- Teach texts like *Al-Mughni* (Ibn Qudamah) upholding:

  - Hudud punishments

  - Apostasy execution

  - Legal inferiority of non-Muslims


### 🌐 5. Online Fatwa Sites & Global Da'wah Platforms

- **Islam Q&A** (Shaykh al-Munajjid): “Fighting disbelievers is the greatest jihad.”

- **Ask Imam** (Mufti Ebrahim Desai): Repeats rulings on apostasy, blasphemy, and offensive war.

- **Al-Islam.org** (Shia): Endorses offensive jihad under Islamic government.


**Conclusion**: Classical jihad is not archived—it is actively taught. These institutions preserve and transmit the very doctrines used by past empires and modern jihadists alike. The system is alive, well-funded, and global.


## Appendix IV: Polished Masks – How Western Islamic Institutions Rebrand Classical Supremacism


In the West, Islamic institutions have adopted a dual strategy: they **sanitize the public narrative** while **preserving the classical doctrines internally**. This rhetorical shift doesn’t change the content—it hides it.


### πŸŽ“ 1. Zaytuna College (Berkeley, USA)

- Founded by Hamza Yusuf and Zaid Shakir; promoted as a “moderate” Islamic liberal arts college.

- Internal curriculum includes:

  - *Ihya Ulum al-Din* (al-Ghazali): Affirms jihad as a divine obligation.

  - *Reliance of the Traveller*: Confirms apostasy execution, jizya, and war against non-Muslims.

- Public branding emphasizes “ethics,” “tradition,” and “beauty,” but avoids terms like jihad, hudud, or dhimma.


### 🏫 2. Markfield Institute (UK)

- Associated with the Islamic Foundation and promotes Maududi’s writings.

- Public image: Interfaith and academic engagement.

- Private teachings include:

  - *Fiqh al-Sunnah* (Sayyid Sabiq): Covers corporal punishment and apostasy laws.

  - *The Islamic Way of Life* (Maududi): Calls democracy a form of shirk and endorses theocratic rule.


### πŸ’» 3. Islamic Online University (Bilal Philips)

- Markets itself as accessible, online Islamic education for Western Muslims.

- Content includes:

  - *Majmu‘ al-Fatawa* (Ibn Taymiyyah)

  - Wahhabi-Salafi jurisprudence endorsing jihad, hudud, and takfir

- Public-facing tone is moderate; internal content is deeply orthodox.


### πŸŽ“ 4. Islamic Studies Departments in Western Academia

- Institutions like Harvard, Oxford, and SOAS often romanticize Islam through Sufi mysticism and interfaith dialogue.

- Scholars cite figures like al-Ghazali without acknowledging their support of offensive jihad and blasphemy laws.

- Result: Students get a filtered, aestheticized Islam—stripped of its supremacist core.


### πŸ•Œ 5. ISNA and CAIR (USA)

- Promote “diversity,” “civil rights,” and “anti-Islamophobia” narratives.

- Invite speakers like Siraj Wahhaj and Omar Suleiman who affirm classical Sharia internally.

- Avoid discussion of Sharia’s harsher aspects in public, but support them in Arabic lectures and texts.


### πŸ” Summary

These institutions are not **reforming** Islam. They are **rebranding** it.

- Harsh doctrines remain in curricula and private discourse.

- Euphemisms replace clarity: jihad becomes “struggle,” hudud becomes “divine boundaries,” Sharia becomes “ethical framework.”

- Arabic terms are left untranslated to obscure meaning from Western audiences.


**The content hasn’t changed—only the cover.**


## Appendix V: Online Preachers & Influencers – The New Faces of Classical Islamic Supremacism


With the rise of social media, classical Islamic doctrines have been reintroduced to a new generation—not through dusty books, but through **charismatic online personalities**, often under the guise of community, empowerment, and identity politics.


### πŸŽ₯ 1. YouTube Preachers – Mainstreaming Sharia Through ‘Debates’

#### πŸ’¬ Muhammad Hijab (UK)

- Frames Islamic law as superior to secular systems.

- Often refers to classical texts in debates while omitting their harsh content.

- Promotes the idea of **Islam as the final authority** and criticizes Western democracy.

- Subtly endorses the **Caliphate model** through historical references and political rhetoric.


#### πŸ’¬ Shaykh Dr. Yasir Qadhi (USA)

- Speaks in academic tones, often presenting himself as moderate.

- However, has openly discussed the **long-term goal of Caliphate-style governance**.

- Avoids explicitly endorsing violence but defends classical Islamic law in principle.


### πŸ“Έ 2. TikTok & Instagram Influencers – Aestheticized Supremacism

#### πŸ“Έ Imam Omar Suleiman

- Known for interfaith efforts, yet regularly emphasizes **Islamic dominance over secularism**.

- Uses emotionally resonant messaging to appeal to young Muslims while maintaining a Sharia-centric worldview.


#### πŸ“Έ Nadirah Anguin

- Promotes spiritual jihad and Muslim separatism.

- Emphasizes Islamic governance and law as essential to true empowerment.

- Carefully avoids legal specifics while gesturing toward classical jurisprudence.


### πŸ”΄ 3. Coded Messaging: Soft Jihad in Digital Format

- Terms like **“hikmah,” “struggle,” and “justice”** mask classical concepts of dominance and law enforcement.

- Encouragement of Muslim identity often comes with **implicit rejection of Western governance**.

- **Victimhood narratives** are used to justify the superiority of Islamic systems over secular ones.


### 🧨 4. Dangerous Influence: A New Breed of Radicalization

- These influencers rarely advocate violence directly, but they **normalize supremacy**, **delegitimize Western values**, and **pave the way for deeper radicalization**.

- Platforms like YouTube and TikTok amplify their content, bypassing traditional scholarly gatekeeping.


### ⚠️ Conclusion

This is not fringe—it is **mainstream, digitized dawah**, and it’s reshaping the worldview of millions. These influencers are not reformers. They are **translators of old power structures into modern media ecosystems**.


**What was once preached in the mosque is now livestreamed on demand.**


 How Muhammad’s War Doctrine Became the Backbone of the Islamic Empire


## PART I: The Rashidun Blueprint – Muhammad’s Legacy as Law

After Muhammad’s death in 632 CE, the Muslim community faced a power vacuum—and a critical theological question: *What is Islam without its prophet?* The answer given by the first four caliphs—Abu Bakr, Umar, Uthman, and Ali—was clear: Islam is a state, an army, and a law. Their mission was not to spiritualize Muhammad’s message—but to weaponize and legalize it.


### A. Abu Bakr and the Ridda Wars – Islam as Irrevocable Allegiance

Abu Bakr’s rule (632–634) began in crisis. Tribes across Arabia, previously aligned to Muhammad through personal loyalty or strategic gain, began to defect. Many said they accepted *Muhammad*—not Islam—and with his death, their obligations ended. But Abu Bakr issued a doctrine-altering decree: leaving Islam after professing it was not a tribal shift—it was apostasy, and apostasy meant war.


> “I will fight anyone who makes a distinction between prayer and zakat.” – Abu Bakr


The Ridda Wars established a precedent: Islam is not voluntary once accepted. The penalty for apostasy was no longer just spiritual—it was military annihilation. This became the backbone for later Sharia laws that still prescribe death for apostates.


**Legal Legacy**: Classical jurists like Al-Shafi‘i and Ibn Taymiyyah, along with manuals like Reliance of the Traveller, anchor this moment as proof that apostasy equals treason.


### B. Umar ibn al-Khattab – Strategic Theocrat and Imperial Builder

Umar (r. 634–644) was not merely a warrior—he was an administrative genius. Under his leadership, the Islamic empire quadrupled, conquering Persia, Syria, Egypt, and Palestine in less than a decade. But conquest wasn’t chaotic—it was jurisprudentially structured.


- **Jizya Tax**: A per-capita tax on non-Muslims (Qur’an 9:29) to signify subjugation, not mere coexistence.

- **Dhimmi Status**: Jews and Christians could live under Islam’s protection, but only as legal inferiors—forbidden from bearing arms, building new places of worship, or holding equal legal status.


**Institutionalization**: These policies were absorbed into the Maliki, Hanafi, and Shafi‘i schools as part of siyar—the law governing Muslim-non-Muslim relations. Umar’s methods became textbook examples of Islamic governance.


### C. Legalization of War Booty – Human Lives as Lawful Gains

Muhammad’s actions in campaigns like Khaybar, Banu Qurayza, and Hunayn set the precedent: conquered women could be enslaved, and land seized. The Rashidun caliphs not only followed this model—they canonized it.


- Women taken as concubines without marriage or consent

- Lands distributed to Muslim fighters and elites, creating the **diwan** (state payroll system for warriors)


**No jurist ever abrogated this.** Instead, works like Malik’s Muwatta and Al-Shafi‘i’s Risala encode it as Sharia-compliant spoils of jihad.


> *“Captured women may be taken as concubines.”* – Muwatta, Book 21, Hadith 3


## PART II: The Umayyad Empire – Militarized Expansion as State Policy

The Umayyad dynasty (661–750 CE), rising after the assassination of Ali, marked the transformation of the Caliphate into a hereditary monarchy. But their real legacy was in **institutionalizing jihad** as an engine of imperial growth. If the Rashidun laid the foundation, the Umayyads built the war machine.


### A. Institutionalized Jihad – From Doctrine to Empire

Under caliphs like **Mu’awiyah**, **Abd al-Malik**, and **Walid I**, the Islamic state launched systematic military campaigns into **North Africa**, **Spain (Al-Andalus)**, **Transoxiana**, and even attempted to take **Constantinople**. The ideological rationale came straight from the Quran and Muhammad’s example:


- **Qur’an 9:29** – “Fight those who do not believe… until they pay the jizya with willing submission.”

- **Hadiths from Bukhari and Muslim** – glorifying martyrdom, conquest, and the promise of paradise for warriors


**State policy became religious obligation.** Military expansion was no longer reactive—it was *fard kifaya* (communal obligation) to wage **offensive jihad** against all non-Muslim lands (Dar al-Harb).


**Key Legal Concept**: The world was now divided into:

- **Dar al-Islam** – the realm under Islamic rule

- **Dar al-Harb** – the realm of war, to be subdued


### B. Centralization of Sharia and Arab Supremacy

While conquering new lands, the Umayyads also **Arabized the empire**. Arabic became the language of governance, coinage, and religious authority. Converts to Islam from non-Arab backgrounds (**mawali**) were systematically discriminated against, taxed, and treated as second-class Muslims.


This wasn’t just economic—it was **jurisprudential**. The Qurayshi Arab identity was seen as divinely favored, following traditions rooted in Muhammad’s own tribe.


**Theology and ethnicity fused**, giving birth to a supremacist identity backed by:

- Legal precedence (favoring Arabs in leadership)

- Religious justification (claiming Arab lineage as spiritual virtue)

- Cultural imposition (Arabic prayer, Qur’an, and legal instruction)


This model helped establish the **Islamic Caliphate as both a racial and religious hierarchy**—with Arabs at the top and everyone else beneath.


### C. Legal Evolution: Jihad Becomes Policy, Not Just Practice

The Umayyads were not just expanding physically—they were setting legal precedents that would later be canonized by the Abbasid-era scholars. **Campaigns were not merely wars—they were jurisprudential templates**.


- **Siyar** (Islamic law of war) began evolving in earnest

- Islamic jurists began codifying the terms under which jihad could be declared

- Concepts like **ceasefire (hudna)**, **tribute (jizya)**, and **terms of surrender (aman)** became legal categories


This formalized what Muhammad had started: jihad was no longer an expedient—it was **infrastructure**.


## PART III: The Abbasids – The Scholastic Empire of Sharia

The Abbasid dynasty (750–1258 CE) did more than inherit an empire—they **codified it into theology**. If the Rashidun and Umayyads built Islam’s military and territorial foundations, the Abbasids gave it its **ideological spine**. They formalized Muhammad’s war doctrines not as expedient wartime practices—but as **universal legal obligations**.


### A. Rise of the Madhhabs – Codifying War, Slavery, and Supremacy

The Abbasid era birthed the **four Sunni madhhabs** (legal schools): Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi‘i, and Hanbali. Each school, while differing in technicalities, agreed on the fundamentals:


- **Offensive jihad** is an obligation on the Muslim community

- **Apostasy is punishable by death**

- **Non-Muslims must pay jizya** and live as dhimmis

- **Slavery of war captives** is lawful and perpetual

- **The world is divided** into Dar al-Islam and Dar al-Harb


These doctrines were **not optional**; they were **sanctified as divine law** using:

- Qur’anic verses (esp. Surah 9)

- Hadiths attributed to Muhammad

- The consensus of the Sahabah (Companions)

- Muhammad’s own wartime precedents


The result: war, subjugation, and supremacy were now **religiously normative**, not just historically reactive.


### B. The Hadith Project – Sanctifying Brutality

Under the Abbasids, **Hadith compilation became a state-sponsored religious project**. Scholars like **Bukhari, Muslim, Abu Dawud, and Ibn Majah** traveled to collect traditions attributed to Muhammad.


Many of these hadiths explicitly justified:

- Beheading non-believers

- The permanent right to own and have sex with concubines

- Executing apostates, blasphemers, and critics of Islam

- Global jihad to bring the world under Islamic rule


**Examples from Sahih Bukhari and Sahih Muslim:**

- “Whoever changes his religion, kill him.” – Bukhari 9:84:57

- “I have been commanded to fight the people until they testify...” – Muslim 1:33


These were not fringe sayings. They were canonized into **‘sahih’ (authentic)** collections, **elevated to near-Qur’anic authority**.


The Abbasids **weren’t distorting Muhammad’s legacy—they were sealing it in law.**


### C. Theology with Teeth – The Emergence of Islamic Constitutionalism

The Abbasids laid the groundwork for what can only be called **Islamic constitutionalism**. Works like:

- **Al-Mawardi’s Al-Ahkam al-Sultaniyya**

- **Shafi‘i’s Risala**

- **The early usul al-fiqh texts (foundations of jurisprudence)**


…didn’t just theorize Islamic governance—they defined its **obligations**:


- The **caliph must wage jihad** regularly

- Apostates must be **hunted and executed**

- Non-Muslims must live in **humiliation** under Islamic rule

- Sharia must be implemented in **every sphere of life**—spiritual, legal, political, and military


**Summary**: The Abbasids completed the project of Muhammad’s Medina. They turned a prophetic movement into a **state ideology** backed by **jurisprudence, violence, and divine claims**. It was the first time in history that a complete, militarized theocratic legal system was exported across continents in the name of God—and it came with full scholarly backing.


## PART IV: The Ottomans – Codified Theocracy on a Global Scale

The Ottoman Empire (1299–1924) was not just a sultanate—it was the **final institutional expression of the Caliphate**. Where the Abbasids codified Muhammad’s war doctrines into law, the Ottomans globalized them with bureaucratic precision. Spanning Europe, Asia, and Africa, the Ottoman state fused **Hanafi jurisprudence**, **military conquest**, and **imperial theocracy** into one unified system of control.


### A. Caliphate Headquarters – Global Jihad from the Palace

The Ottoman sultans, beginning with **Selim I**, adopted the title of **Caliph** after conquering the Mamluks in 1517. This wasn't symbolic. It legitimized their empire as the **official successor of Muhammad**—a spiritual and military commander-in-chief.


**Jihad became formal statecraft**. Major campaigns—against Byzantines, Safavids, Austrians, and Hungarians—were launched with **religious edicts (fatwas)** from the **Sheikh al-Islam**, the highest religious authority. These wars weren’t just political—they were theological:


- To expand Dar al-Islam

- To impose Sharia over non-Muslim populations

- To uphold Muhammad’s model of offensive jihad


**Theological engine**: Hanafi jurisprudence, which provided:

- **Flexible tools for empire-building**

- **Broad allowances for enslavement, taxation, and military expansion**


Ottoman conquests weren’t random—they were **systematic, law-driven jihad missions**, echoing Muhammad’s Medina.


### B. The Devshirme and Janissaries – Institutional Slavery for Islamic Supremacy

One of the most infamous Ottoman innovations was the **Devshirme system**—the forced conscription of **Christian boys**, converted to Islam, and trained as elite soldiers (**Janissaries**). This practice was justified by Ottoman clerics using:

- Hanafi legal theory on **slavery and conversion**

- Precedents from Muhammad’s treatment of war captives


These boys were:

- Taken from their homes across the Balkans

- Converted to Islam under state orders

- Trained in military jihad and fiercely loyal to the Sultan-Caliph


This wasn’t just manpower—it was **ideological weaponry**. The Janissaries were:

- The **teeth of the Caliphate**

- The **enforcers of Sharia**

- A living embodiment of Islam’s right to dominate non-Muslims by force


### C. Sharia Above All – The Ottoman Legal Machine

While the Ottomans developed their own administrative laws (**Kanun**), they never allowed it to override **Sharia**. Civil governance was permitted—but only if it did not contradict the **core fiqh rulings**.


**Key principles:**

- All legal matters involving Muslims were judged by **Sharia courts**

- **Non-Muslims** had limited autonomy under **millet** systems but were still:

  - Taxed (jizya)

  - Segregated socially

  - Denied political equality


As late as the 19th century, the Ottoman Empire still upheld laws rooted in Qur’an 9:29:

- Non-Muslims must pay jizya “with willing submission”

- Dhimmis must remain **visibly inferior** in status and rights


**Conclusion**: The Ottoman Empire didn’t modify Muhammad’s legal legacy—it **perfected its application** at the scale of a superstate. It was the culmination of centuries of Islamic jurisprudence, conquest, and religious law—stretching Muhammad’s 7th-century doctrine across continents and centuries.


## PART V: Conclusion – From Revelation to Empire

The historical progression from Muhammad’s personal leadership to global Islamic empire was not a detour—it was a **direct extension** of his example. Each Islamic regime took the template Muhammad laid down in Medina and **refined it into law, policy, and precedent**.


This wasn’t accidental. The very structure of the Islamic legal tradition—rooted in:

- **The Qur’an**

- **The Hadith**

- **The Sira (biography of Muhammad)**

- **Ijma (consensus of scholars)**


…ensured that Muhammad’s political, military, and theological behaviors were not only **imitated** but **institutionalized**.


### What Did Each Era Contribute?

- **The Rashidun**: Enforced that apostasy equals treason. Made jihad obligatory. Used Muhammad’s actions as legal precedent.

- **The Umayyads**: Built an imperial war machine. Institutionalized racial and religious supremacy. Waged jihad as policy.

- **The Abbasids**: Codified Sharia into a scholastic legal system. Turned brutality into sacred law. Elevated Hadith to legislative status.

- **The Ottomans**: Globalized the jihad state. Embedded religious supremacism into imperial bureaucracy. Perfected Islamic governance at scale.


### Why This Matters Today

Modern Islamic apologists often claim that the **caliphates distorted Muhammad’s message**—that violent groups today are **misinterpreting Islam**. But history, jurisprudence, and source material say otherwise:


- No major Sunni legal school ever repudiated **offensive jihad**

- None rejected **death for apostasy**

- All endorsed **slavery of war captives**

- All upheld the **legal inferiority of non-Muslims**


**The empires didn’t betray Muhammad—they fulfilled him.**


This continuity—from revelation to regulation, from Medina to modernity—exposes an uncomfortable truth:


> The real problem is not just how Islam has been practiced. The problem is what Islam, in its **classical legal form**, actually is.


**Until that core is reexamined, reformed, or rejected, the ideological legacy of Muhammad’s war doctrine will continue—**not just in terror cells, but in classrooms, mosques, state laws, and social attitudes from Cairo to California.


Islam’s classical foundation wasn’t peaceful. It was **imperial, supremacist, and militant**.


And it left the world not with a message—but with a machine.

 From Prophethood to Caliphate: How Muhammad’s War Doctrine Became the Backbone of Islamic Empire


I. The Rashidun Blueprint: Muhammad’s Legacy as Law

After Muhammad’s death in 632 CE, the first four caliphs (Abu Bakr, Umar, Uthman, and Ali) were not innovators—they were executors. Their job was to preserve and expand the very model Muhammad established: a militarized theocracy, fueled by plunder, zeal, and divine sanction.

A. Abu Bakr and the Ridda Wars

  • The first caliph used violence to enforce religious conformity. When Arab tribes abandoned Islam after Muhammad's death, Abu Bakr launched brutal campaigns to force them back under Medina’s authority.

  • These wars institutionalized apostasy as treason, laying the basis for later fiqh rulings mandating death for apostates.

“I will fight anyone who makes a distinction between prayer and zakat.” – Abu Bakr

B. Umar ibn al-Khattab: Architect of Conquest

  • Under Umar, the Islamic empire exploded into Persia, Egypt, and the Levant.

  • He systematized the jizya tax on non-Muslims and formalized the Dhimmi status.

  • Umar’s policies became jurisprudential templates: codified by jurists as part of siyar (Islamic law of war and foreign relations).

C. Legalization of Land and Women as War Booty

  • The Rashidun era validated Muhammad’s treatment of conquered lands and female captives as a perpetual precedent.

  • These practices later entered all major books of fiqh—no abrogation, no reform.


II. Umayyad Empire: Militarized Expansion as State Policy

The Umayyads (661–750) turned the jihad model into a full-blown imperial engine. They didn't just follow Muhammad—they industrialized him.

A. Institutionalized Jihad

  • Caliphs like Mu’awiyah and Walid I launched near-constant campaigns into North Africa, Spain, and Central Asia.

  • The legal justification was simple: Dar al-Harb must be subdued.

B. Centralization of Sharia and Arab Supremacy

  • The Umayyads merged religion and state violently. Arabic became the administrative language, and Islam the state ideology.

  • Non-Arabs (mawali) were second-class citizens—even as Muslims. This racism was justified using early Islamic precedents of Qurayshi supremacy.


III. Abbasids: The Scholastic Empire of Sharia

The Abbasids (750–1258) were not just warriors—they were theologians with swords. They transformed Muhammad’s militarism into codified ideology.

A. Rise of the Madhhabs (Legal Schools)

  • Under the Abbasids, the four Sunni madhhabs were canonized.

  • These schools sanctified every major war doctrine of Muhammad:

    • Offensive jihad as obligation

    • Death for apostasy

    • Jizya as humiliation

    • Legal sexual slavery

    • Division of the world into Dar al-Islam and Dar al-Harb

B. Use of Hadith to Justify Brutality

  • Collections like Sahih Bukhari and Sahih Muslim, compiled in the Abbasid era, include hadith glorifying conquest, beheadings, and bloodshed.

  • The Abbasid project was not reform—it was legitimization.


IV. Ottoman Empire: Codified Theocracy on a Global Scale

The Ottomans (1299–1924) were the final and perhaps most refined expression of Muhammad’s imperial dream.

A. The Caliphate as Global Jihad Headquarters

  • From Suleiman the Magnificent to Abdul Hamid II, the caliph was both sultan and successor to Muhammad.

  • Ottoman law (Kanun) was always subordinated to Sharia—especially Hanafi fiqh, the most expansive and militarily permissive of the four schools.

B. The Devshirme and Janissaries: Codified Slavery for Jihad

  • Christian boys were kidnapped, converted, and militarized under state policy. This was religiously justified as a means to strengthen Islam.

  • These boys became elite troops—the sword of Allah institutionalized.

C. Legal Status of Dhimmis Maintained

  • Even in the 19th century, Christians and Jews were still taxed, segregated, and politically suppressed.

  • The Ottomans never abolished the Qur’an-based hierarchy of belief.


V. Conclusion: From Revelation to Empire

Muhammad’s sword didn’t stop at his grave—it was passed down, institutionalized, sharpened, and globalized.

Each successive Islamic regime built upon the legal and military precedents set by Muhammad:

  • The Rashidun proved that apostasy is punishable by death and conquest is righteous.

  • The Umayyads systematized racial and religious hierarchy.

  • The Abbasids turned brutality into canon law.

  • The Ottomans globalized it—and used theology to justify slavery, suppression, and perpetual war.

Modern Islamic apologists claim this legacy is a distortion. But the legacy is not a distortion of Muhammad—it is his direct legal consequence. The classical Islamic empires didn’t betray Muhammad’s teachings.

They fulfilled them.

 

πŸ“œ Appendix: Classical Sources Proving the Continuity of Muhammad’s War Doctrine


1. Reliance of the Traveller (‘Umdat al-Salik)

Legal Manual of the Shafi‘i School, certified by Al-Azhar University.

On Offensive Jihad:

“Jihad is a communal obligation (fard kifaya)... to make war upon non-Muslims...”
(Reliance, o9.1–o9.9)

On Apostasy:

“When a person who has reached puberty and is sane voluntarily apostatizes from Islam, he deserves to be killed.”
(Reliance, o8.1)

On Dhimmis:

Non-Muslims must be humiliated, pay jizya, and are forbidden to publicly practice religion.
(Reliance, o11.1–11.11)


2. Malik’s Muwatta

Imam Malik (d. 795), founder of the Maliki madhhab, codified Medina’s practices—many directly linked to Muhammad’s actions.

On War Booty:

“Captured women may be taken as concubines.”
(Muwatta, Book 21, Hadith 3)

On Jizya and Dhimmitude:

“Umar imposed a tax on the people of the Book... humiliation upon them.”
(Muwatta, Book 17, Hadith 4)


3. Al-Shafi‘i’s Risala

Foundational text for the Shafi‘i legal school, one of the most influential Sunni traditions.

On the Prophet’s Legal Authority:

“Everything the Prophet ordered is obligatory... his commands are law.”
(Risala, §289–291)

On Fighting Non-Muslims:

“Fight those who do not believe in Allah... until they pay the jizya.”
Based on Qur’an 9:29 and Hadith traditions integrated into Shafi‘i legal reasoning.


4. Al-Mawardi’s Al-Ahkam al-Sultaniyya (The Ordinances of Government)

Written under the Abbasids, this manual outlines ideal Islamic governance.

On Caliphal Duties:

“The Imam must prepare armies... and wage jihad against those who resist Islam.”
(Al-Ahkam, Chapter on Jihad)

On the Dhimmi System:

Dhimmis must be “subdued” and treated with “contempt” to preserve Islamic supremacy.
(Al-Ahkam, Chapter on Non-Muslims)


5. Ottoman Legal Codices (Kanun and Sharia Integration)

On Slavery and Devshirme:

  • The Devshirme system (enslavement and Islamization of Christian boys) was sanctioned as a form of jihad and enforced by Sharia courts.

  • Legal defense of the practice found in Ottoman fatwas by scholars like Ebu's-su'ud Efendi.

On Governance:

  • The Kanun (civil law) was always subordinate to Sharia. Ottoman Grand Muftis issued binding fatwas ensuring all state actions aligned with Hanafi jurisprudence.


6. Ibn Taymiyyah (d. 1328) – The Salafi bridge between medieval and modern jihad

On Apostasy:

“There is no dispute among scholars that apostates must be killed.”
(Majmu’ al-Fatawa, Vol. 28, p. 534)

On Jihad Against the World:

“The purpose of jihad is not only to repel aggression... but to establish Islam everywhere.”
(Majmu’ al-Fatawa, Vol. 28, p. 417)


πŸ“š Conclusion: The Legal Chain is Unbroken

This appendix reveals that:

  • Muhammad’s war doctrine was not abandoned—it was engraved into law.

  • Each Islamic empire took his blueprint and embedded it deeper into institutional and religious life.

  • No major classical jurist or legal tradition ever repudiated offensive jihad, death for apostasy, or the subjugation of non-Muslims. Instead, they canonized it.

Islamic apologists claim the Prophet’s legacy was “misunderstood.” The reality is that it was understood too well—by those who built an empire on his words.

πŸ“œ Appendix Part II: From Sharia to Shrapnel – Modern Islamists and Their Classical Roots


πŸ”₯ 1. Sayyid Qutb (d. 1966) – The Intellectual Godfather of Global Jihad

Primary WorkMilestones (Ma‘alim fi’l-Tariq)

Jihad as Permanent Revolution:

“Jihad in Islam is not a defensive war... Islam has the right to destroy all obstacles in the form of institutions and traditions...”

— Milestones, Ch. 4

πŸ” Connection to Classical Thought: Qutb revives the classical notion of offensive jihad, rejecting the idea that Islam is only reactive. He quotes:

  • Qur’an 9:29 ("fight those who do not believe…")

  • Ibn Taymiyyah’s fatwas on continuous warfare

  • Classical fiqh on the division of the world into Dar al-Islam and Dar al-Harb


⚔️ 2. Abul A‘la Mawdudi (d. 1979) – The Theocrat’s Strategist

Founder: Jamaat-e-Islami
Primary WorkTowards Understanding IslamJihad in Islam

Islam as a Political System:

“Islam is a revolutionary ideology and program which seeks to alter the social order of the whole world... Jihad means to struggle to seize power and establish an Islamic state.”

πŸ” Fiqh Linkage: Mawdudi calls on the legal tradition that:

  • Obligates Muslims to “enjoin good and forbid evil” through power (see Reliance o25)

  • Commands jihad as state policy (Mawardi’s Ahkam al-Sultaniyya)

He also cites the Caliphal model and Shafi’i legal reasoning as the gold standard for state-building.


πŸ’£ 3. Osama bin Laden (d. 2011) – From Fatwa to Fireball

Primary TextDeclaration of War Against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places (1996)

Justification of Violence:

“The ruling to kill the Americans and their allies—civilians and military—is an individual duty... in accordance with the words of Almighty Allah.”

πŸ” Islamic Legal Justification:

  • Cites Qur’an 9:5, 9:29, and 2:190–191

  • Refers to classical scholars like Ibn Taymiyyah and Al-Nawawi

  • Quotes Al-Muwatta and fiqh rulings on warfare and apostasy

Bin Laden’s justification for suicide attacks is framed as martyrdom (istishhad), citing precedents where early Muslims willingly died for Islam’s expansion (e.g., Battle of Badr, Uhud).


πŸ“– 4. Ayman al-Zawahiri (d. 2022) – The Scholar of Slaughter

Primary WorksKnights Under the Prophet’s Banner

Legal Framing of Global Jihad:

“We are not fighting to eliminate injustice... We are fighting to implement the Sharia.”

πŸ” Source Material:

  • Invokes Shafi’i and Hanbali jurisprudence

  • Repeatedly references the Reliance of the Traveller

  • Frames jihad as both collective and individual duty (fard ‘ayn) once Muslims are attacked—expanding it globally


🧱 5. ISIS (Daesh) & the Caliphate Blueprint

Primary Legal TextThe Dabiq Magazine (Official ISIS Publication)

Doctrinal Backbone:

“The caliphate is not a dream... it is the return of Allah’s law... jihad against the kuffar is not optional.”

πŸ” Legal Foundations:

  • Direct quotes from Ibn KathirIbn TaymiyyahAl-Shafi‘i, and Mawardi

  • Reimplementation of:

    • Jizya (taxation of Christians and Yazidis)

    • Slavery and sex-slavery, justified with Malik and Hanbali texts

    • Apostasy laws to justify mass executions


🧩 Conclusion: No Discontinuity, Just Deployment

Modern jihadists don’t innovate—they excavate. They mine the classical legal tradition to give their violence moral legitimacy, and they succeed because the classical texts never rejected the goals of:

  • Global Islamic dominion

  • Violent enforcement of tawhid

  • Suppression of dissent through war or execution

This appendix seals the case that:

There is no radical Islam and moderate Islam. There is only Islam—radicals just take it seriously.

 

🏫 Appendix Part III: From the Madrassa to the Minbar – How Classical Jihad Lives On in Modern Islamic Education


πŸ•Œ 1. Al-Azhar University (Cairo, Egypt)

Regarded as the Vatican of Sunni Islam, Al-Azhar boasts a millennium of religious authority. Its claims to moderation obscure the continuity of classical fiqh, especially in its formal curriculum.

πŸ“š Jurisprudential Manuals Taught:

  • Al-Muwatta of Malik – Sanctions slavery, stoning, jihad as state expansion

  • Shafi‘i’s Risala – Treats apostasy, jizya, and jihad as divine obligations

  • Umdat al-Salik (Reliance of the Traveller) – Still used in Shafi'i legal courses

πŸ”₯ Explicit Teachings:

  • 2009 Fatwa from Al-Azhar’s Dar al-Ifta affirms:

    “Waging jihad against non-Muslims to spread Islam is a legitimate part of Islamic law.”

  • Graduation Requirement (Usul al-Din Faculty): Courses in Siyar (war jurisprudence) still cover the division of the world into Dar al-Islam vs. Dar al-Harb, and legitimize fighting against non-Muslim lands to establish Sharia.


πŸ“– 2. Pakistan’s Madrassa Network (Deobandi & Barelvi Sects)

Pakistan’s madrassas produce over 30,000 graduates per year, many of whom receive certification (ijazah) in classical texts.

πŸ“˜ Core Curriculum: Dars-e-Nizami

Still includes:

  • Hidayah by Burhan al-Din al-Marghinani (Hanafi manual):

    “Jihad is obligatory... at least once every year.”

  • Nawawi’s Minhaj al-Talibin (Shafi‘i):

    “The caliph fights those who refuse Islam or jizya... even if they do not initiate war.”

  • Al-Ashbah wa al-Nazair (on legal maxims): Reaffirms enslavement and dhimmi hierarchy.

⚠️ Terrorist Links:

  • Many Taliban and Jaish-e-Mohammed leaders are alumni of these seminaries

  • Darul Uloom Haqqania: Known as the "University of Jihad"


πŸ•Œ 3. Saudi Arabia: Wahhabi Endorsement of Classical Jihad

Saudi Arabia’s official curriculum (until 2019 reforms, and still in widespread unofficial circulation) taught:

πŸ“• Tafsir (Qur’anic exegesis) Textbooks:

  • Qur’an 9:5 (“kill the polytheists wherever you find them”) interpreted as:

    “A general order for the Muslims to fight until Islam dominates.”

πŸ“˜ Fiqh Books Used in Schools:

  • Ibn Taymiyyah’s Majmu‘ al-Fatawa

  • Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s Kitab al-Tawhid—labels Christians and Jews as kuffar and enemies of Islam unless subdued

πŸ›‘ The ideological DNA of Al-Qaeda and ISIS remains embedded in these interpretations.


πŸŽ“ 4. University of Medina & Islamic University of Umm al-Qura (Saudi Arabia)

Major international institutions exporting Wahhabi-trained clerics to Africa, Europe, and Southeast Asia.

🧠 Legal Philosophy Still Taught:

  • Ibn Qudamah’s “al-Mughni” (Hanbali fiqh): Explicitly allows for jihad as offensive war and mandates slavery of captives.

  • Upholds the Hudud punishments, apostasy executions, and legal inferiority of non-Muslims


πŸ“‘ 5. Online Fatwa Portals & Da'wah Sites

Many Muslims bypass local imams and turn to:

  • Islam Q&A (run by Shaykh Muhammad al-Munajjid)

    Teaches that fighting disbelievers is “the greatest type of jihad”

  • Ask Imam (Mufti Ebrahim Desai, South Africa)

    Repeats Hanafi rulings on killing apostates, executing blasphemers, and waging war to expand Dar al-Islam

  • Al-Islam.org (Shia-oriented)

    Also affirms offensive jihad under a legitimate Islamic government


🧨 Conclusion: Modern Institutions Are the Arteries of Medieval Islam

These institutions don’t “radicalize”—they preserve. They are not the fringe. They are the mainstream of traditional Islamic thought, and they continue to form the intellectual backbone of jihadism.

Just as Sayyid Qutb reanimated Shafi’i and Ibn Taymiyyah, today's clerics are pouring classical content into modern platforms—whether it’s in a Cairo lecture hall, a Pakistani madrassa, or a YouTube livestream.

πŸ›️ Appendix Part IV: Polished Masks – How Western Islamic Institutions Rebrand Classical Supremacism


πŸŽ“ 1. Zaytuna College (Berkeley, CA, USA)

Founded by Hamza Yusuf and Zaid Shakir, Zaytuna is promoted as the first accredited Islamic liberal arts college in the U.S.

πŸ“š Curriculum Sources:

  • Al-Ghazali’s Ihya Ulum al-Din (includes jihad as religious obligation)

  • Reliance of the Traveller (Shafi‘i manual affirming execution for apostasy, blasphemy, jizya for non-Muslims)

Yet Zaytuna’s public narrative focuses on “beauty,” “tradition,” and “ethics,” carefully avoiding discussion of these harsh doctrines in public forums.

✅ Public language: “Moral excellence,” “Islamic tradition,” “virtue”
❌ Omitted terms: Jihad as warfare, apostasy law, hudud punishments, dhimma system


πŸ‡¬πŸ‡§ 2. Islamic Colleges in the UK

🏫 Markfield Institute of Higher Education (Leicester)

Affiliated with the Islamic Foundation, Markfield offers degrees in Islamic Studies and hosts interfaith dialogues.

But it also draws heavily on Abul A‘la Maududi, the Pakistani founder of Jamaat-e-Islami, who explicitly advocated theocratic rule by Sharia.

Maududi on jihad:

“Islam requires the earth — not just a portion, but the entire planet.”

πŸ“• Textbooks used:

  • Fiqh al-Sunnah by Sayyid Sabiq (includes corporal punishments, apostasy rulings)

  • The Islamic Way of Life by Maududi (calls democracy “a form of shirk”)

⚠️ Tactic: Promote Maududi’s works in Arabic and Urdu syllabi, while whitewashing his message in English-language public engagement.


πŸ•Œ 3. Islamic Online University (founded by Bilal Philips)

Widely accessed by Western Muslims seeking a structured Islamic education.

πŸ” Taught Materials:

  • Ibn Taymiyyah’s Fatawa

  • Classical works promoting hududjihad, and slavery

Though the website projects a moderate image, core teachings include:

“There is a consensus of Islamic jurists on the execution of the apostate.”

✅ Uses modern UX, videos, and English-friendly branding
❌ Still channels Wahhabi and Salafi jurisprudence with minimal reinterpretation


πŸ›️ 4. Western Universities Hosting “Islamic Studies”

πŸ§‘‍🏫 Harvard, Oxford, SOAS (School of Oriental and African Studies), and more

While appearing academic and secular, these institutions regularly host:

  • Professors and guest lecturers who sanitize jihad as merely “inner struggle”

  • Sufi mysticism as a Trojan horse to reintroduce classical Sharia via scholars like al-Ghazali, who explicitly affirmed offensive jihad, and death for apostasy

⚠️ Result: Students encounter an “aesthetic” Islam, divorced from its jurisprudential realities — romanticizing a faith without reckoning with its supremacist legacy.


🎀 5. ISNA, CAIR, and Academic Co-Branding

Groups like the Islamic Society of North America (ISNA) and the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR):

  • Partner with universities for “diversity” and “interfaith” programs

  • Advocate against “Islamophobia” while avoiding condemnation of classical Islamic legal codes still taught worldwide

These groups often invite speakers (like Siraj Wahhaj or Omar Suleiman) who:

  • Publicly affirm belief in the Qur’an’s legal system

  • Avoid discussing hudud, jihad, or dhimma openly but endorse them in closed lectures or texts


🧨 Conclusion: Rebranding Is Not Reform

“Reform” isn’t happening. What’s happening is rhetorical laundering.

Western Islamic institutions are not revising the content of traditional fiqh — they are changing the packaging:

  • Arabic terms are left untranslated (e.g., “hikmah,” “fiqh,” “jihad”) to confuse outsiders.

  • Brutal doctrines are softened with euphemisms: “social justice,” “communal obligations,” “legal pluralism”.

  • The result is a sanitized storefront hiding an unchanged backroom.


πŸ™️ Appendix Part V: Online Preachers & Influencers – The New Faces of Classical Islamic Supremacism


πŸŽ₯ 1. The Rise of Social Media Preachers

The advent of social media has allowed a new breed of Islamic preachers to gain immense influence, especially among young Western Muslims. Platforms like YouTubeInstagramTikTok, and even podcasts have provided a fertile ground for spreading classical Islamic ideas—dressed up in the language of “faith,” “community,” or “peace.”

Despite their slick presentations and glossy images, many of these figures subtly or overtly advocate for theocratic governancejihad, and the rejection of non-Islamic political systems.


πŸ“± 2. YouTube Preachers – The Jihadist Messaging in Disguise

πŸ’¬ Muhammad Hijab

  • Channel: Muhammad Hijab, a prominent UK-based Muslim YouTuber, uses his platform to engage in debates about Islamic lawjihad, and prophet Muhammad’s legacy.

  • Key Themes:

    • Hijab often refers to classical texts and reinterprets them in modern contexts—while avoiding explicit references to offensive jihad. Instead, he speaks of the spiritual struggle or defensive jihad, but selectively omits the legal implications of such struggles.

    • Frequently dismisses non-Muslim governance as “corrupt” and promotes the idea that Islam should be the final authority.

Example Quote: “Jihad is not just a war with swords. It’s a battle to establish justice. We must stand for Islam’s legal system and reject these secular governments.”

While Hijab's rhetoric often appeals to a broader audience, his underlying message echoes the traditional supremacist ideologies of jihad and Sharia.

πŸ’¬ Shaykh Dr. Yasir Qadhi

  • Platform: Known for his academic background and relatively moderate tone, Yasir Qadhi is a revered figure in the Western Muslim community, particularly within North America.

  • Key Themes:

    • Qadhi has, at times, subtly endorsed the idea that Islamic law (Sharia) should ultimately govern society, stating that all Muslims must adhere to a “Caliphate-style” rule eventually.

    • While Qadhi generally avoids direct calls for jihad, his influence as a scholar in the West remains considerable.

Example Quote: "The concept of the Islamic state is a goal we work towards. Muslims, while living in the West, should not forget this central component of their faith."

Qadhi has often been criticized for his ambiguous stance on jihad and the use of Islamic law to challenge Western governance, leading to questions about his commitment to the democratic values of his audience.


🌍 3. TikTok & Instagram Influencers – New Generation, Same Ideas

Social media platforms like TikTok and Instagram have provided younger Muslims with platforms to express their beliefs, often with significant influence on their peers. Though they do not always explicitly discuss topics like jihad or Islamic theocracy, coded language and symbolism regularly emerge in their videos and posts.

πŸ“Έ Imam Omar Suleiman

  • Platform: Omar Suleiman, a highly influential American Muslim scholar, uses social media to promote interfaith dialogue and peace. However, his views on the concept of Islamic governance and Islamic superiority have led to controversies.

  • Key Themes:

    • He advocates for the dominance of Islamic values over non-Islamic ones and often emphasizes the need for Sharia-compliant governance.

    • Suleiman’s commentary frequently omits direct references to offensive jihad, but he leans heavily on the importance of Islamic identityresisting secularism, and empowering Muslim communities to assert themselves politically.

Example Quote: “We are part of a global Muslim community, and the establishment of a just Islamic state is an inherent duty.”

πŸ“Έ Nadirah Anguin

  • Platform: Nadirah Anguin, a rising star among Muslim Instagram influencers, advocates for Islamic empowerment.

  • Key Themes:

    • Uses empowering language about jihad as a spiritual struggle, but carefully avoids clarifying the legal or militant context.

    • Promotes Islamic separatism by encouraging Muslims to form distinct cultural and political identities that align exclusively with Sharia law.

Example Quote: "Our struggle is not just against oppression. It's a fight for Islam’s rightful place in this world, which is under Allah's law.”


πŸ”΄ 4. The Hidden Messages: Coded Language and Soft Jihad

🧠 The Art of Coded Speech:

  • In Western contexts, the direct call to arms or calls for the establishment of an Islamic Caliphate are increasingly rare, as Muslim influencers are aware of the scrutiny their rhetoric faces in secular societies.

  • Instead, these figures focus on:

    • Islamic empowerment: Regular emphasis on Sharia and jihad as peaceful struggles to impose Islamic values.

    • Rejection of secularism: Promotion of Islamic principles as the only valid framework for governance.

    • Victimhood narratives: Emphasizing the Muslim struggle against the West, framing issues like Islamophobia as evidence of the West’s moral decline and justifying future action.

πŸ“‘ Jihad as “Struggle”:

  • While these figures do not directly promote violent jihad, their rhetorical endorsement of Islamic supremacy and Sharia law makes it clear that non-Muslim rule is inherently illegitimate.

  • The underlying message remains that Muslims must resist secularism and fight for the dominance of Islam.


🧨 5. The Dangerous Aftermath: A Generation of Radicalized Muslims

As the figures mentioned above gain mainstream recognition through their platforms, they are shaping the next generation of Muslims, many of whom may not fully grasp the doctrinal implications of what they are being taught.

While the likes of Hijab, Qadhi, Suleiman, and others portray themselves as moderates or peacemakers, their silent endorsement of classical Islamic supremacist ideologies is a ticking time bomb, potentially radicalizing followers to reject Western democracy and yearn for the re-establishment of the Caliphate.

πŸ”₯ Conclusion: The Quiet Revolution

Though the language has evolved and the platforms have shifted, the ideological core of Islamic supremacism remains unchanged. These online figures—while publicly embracing toleranceinterfaith dialogue, and cultural integration—are continuing to spread classical ideas about Shariajihad, and Islamic dominance in a far more insidious, subtle manner.

This online jihad, camouflaged under the guise of “academic discussions” or “interfaith engagement,” is far more dangerous than overt violence—it breeds a long-term cultural and ideological war that can be fought in online forumsuniversities, and social circles, gradually leading to Muslim separatismIslamic theocracy, and the undermining of secular societies from within.

Part VI: The Response of Western Governments to the Quiet, Yet Growing, Threat Within Their Borders


1. Acknowledging the Threat – Western Governments' Initial Hesitation

Over the last several decades, Western governments have been faced with a growing ideological threat from within their own borders—fueled largely by Islamic extremist ideologies propagated through social mediamosques, and even mainstream Islamic organizations. While the rise of radical violence (e.g., terrorist attacks) has captured the bulk of governmental attention, the ideological threat—embodied in the online jihadistsIslamic preachers, and Islamic supremacist rhetoric—has often been downplayed or overlooked.

Early Inaction:

  • In the aftermath of major terrorist events such as 9/11, the focus of Western governments quickly shifted to combating violent extremism through counterterrorism policies, military actions, and intelligence operations. However, ideological warfare—the battle over values, governance, and culture—was often viewed as secondary to immediate security concerns.

  • Western governments have also been cautious to tread lightly on issues regarding Islamic ideologies, fearing backlash against Muslim communities or accusations of Islamophobia. Many have adopted a stance of "political correctness," refusing to address the potentially dangerous implications of the ideological spread of Shariajihad, and Islamic supremacy due to concerns over freedom of speech and cultural sensitivity.

2. Policy Inaction vs. Political Correctness: A Deadly Stalemate

Western leaders often face a delicate balancing act. On one hand, they are aware of the dangers posed by the growing radicalization of Muslims and the influence of Islamic supremacist rhetoric in the media and mosques. On the other hand, they face the political and social pressures of appeasing Muslim communities, which has led many governments to avoid taking strong action against figures who spread these ideas.

Examples of Inaction:

  • In the UK, the phenomenon of radical preachers like Anwar al-AwlakiAbu Qatada, and Abu Hamza gained prominence in the early 2000s. Despite their obvious radical rhetoric, these preachers were allowed to remain active within UK borders, sometimes even being allowed to spread their extremist messages freely in mosques and public forums, due to free speech protections.

  • France faced similar challenges, where Salafi preachers—some of whom openly called for the establishment of Sharia law in France—were able to gain a foothold in marginalized communities. These figures, often operating in a grey legal area, were protected by free speech laws, despite their deeply problematic and subversive rhetoric.

The Political Correctness Trap:

  • Western governments, especially in Europe, have often shied away from calling out problematic ideologies within Islamic communities. Terms like "Islamic extremism" have been replaced with vague terms like "violent extremism," to avoid associating Islam with terrorism. This has led to a lack of clarity in public discourse and policymaking.

  • Academia and media outlets in the West have contributed to this by focusing on the positive aspects of Islam and avoiding the discussion of Islamic texts that explicitly endorse violencejihad, or Sharia law as a system of governance. By sanitizing these aspects, the dangers of Islamic supremacism are downplayed or ignored entirely.


3. The Growing Challenge: Islamic Radicals in the Digital Age

The global reach of social media has exponentially expanded the influence of Islamic preachers, making it more difficult for Western governments to control or monitor extremist messaging. Platforms like YouTubeInstagram, and TikTok serve as ideal spaces for radicalization, providing a new generation of Western Muslims with easy access to extremist ideologies in a controlled and censored environment.

Radicalization through Social Media:

  • YouTube preachers like Muhammad Hijab and Shaykh Hamza Yusuf are able to reach millions of viewers across the globe, using polished rhetoric and compelling narratives that resonate with both moderate and more radical Muslim audiences.

  • The digital age has allowed these influencers to bypass traditional gatekeepers, such as mosques, scholars, and government surveillance, spreading their message directly to their followers.

Algorithmic Amplification:

  • Social media algorithms inadvertently amplify extremist messages, as content that engages users—whether through controversial or emotional content—tends to be prioritized.

  • The focus on viewsengagement, and shares means that provocative messages that align with the views of radical Muslim influencers are often promoted far more heavily than more moderate or academic content.


4. Reactive Measures: Government Crackdowns

As the threats from Islamic extremism and radicalization through online influencers have grown, many Western governments have finally begun to take some reactive measures to counteract this threat.

Case Studies in Policy Response:

  • The UK has, in recent years, implemented counter-extremism programs like Prevent, which focuses on deradicalizing Muslims who show signs of being influenced by extremist ideologies. However, these programs have been criticized for being ineffective or even counterproductive, as they sometimes alienate Muslim communities by framing them all as potential threats.

  • France has taken a stronger approach in recent years, implementing anti-radicalization policies that involve closing down extremist mosquesprosecuting individuals who incite violence, and promoting secularism in public spaces. However, these actions have also drawn backlash from some Muslim communities who feel unfairly targeted.

Online Censorship and Surveillance:

  • Governments, especially in Europe, have begun to crack down on extremist content online by pushing for more stringent regulation of social media platforms. For example, in the EU, the Digital Services Act has been designed to force social media companies to remove harmful content, including extremist rhetoric.

  • However, the challenge remains that platforms like Facebook, YouTube, and Twitter continue to be slow to act on Islamic supremacist content, and when they do, it is often easily bypassed by shifting to other less-policed platforms.


5. The Dangers of Appeasement: How Western Governments May Be Facilitating the Spread

The continued appeasement of certain Islamic groups—whether out of fear of Islamophobia accusations or due to the political goal of integrating Muslims into Western societies—is actually allowing Islamic supremacist ideologies to fester in the West.

Case Example: Muslim Brotherhood and Radical Groups:

  • The Muslim Brotherhood—a globally recognized Islamist political and social movement—has infiltrated Western institutions with the aim of establishing Sharia-compliant governance. In the UK, the Brotherhood has cultivated deep political relationships with certain political leaders and charities, pushing for policies that would favor Islamic law.

  • Some of these figures have been linked to online jihadist propaganda, presenting Sharia law and Islamic governance as solutions to societal issues in the West.

Key pointIslamism, in the form of political Islam, continues to subtly influence Western academic institutionsmedia outlets, and even legislative bodies.


6. The Long-Term Challenge: The Ideological War Continues

While there have been efforts to curb violent extremism, the ideological struggle remains the central challenge. For Western governments to effectively address the Islamic supremacist threat, they must face the uncomfortable truth about the pervasive role of Islamic doctrines that advocate for theocratic governancejihad, and the imposition of Sharia law.

  • This involves not just countering violent jihad, but also fighting the ideological warfare that is being waged through platforms like YouTube and TikTok, and within universities and mosques.

Key takeaways: Governments must be prepared to confront the reality of Sharia-based political agendas, reject Islamist ideologies, and focus on protecting secular values—all while navigating the difficult path of balancing free speech with the fight against radicalization.


Conclusion: The Need for a Clear-Eyed, Uncompromising Response

The quiet spread of radical Islamic ideologies in the West via social mediaonline preachers, and Islamist influencers is one of the greatest threats to secular democracy in the 21st century. Until Western governments acknowledge and take a firm stance against the ideological underpinnings of political Islam, the struggle for the soul of the West will continue to intensify.

Governments must stop dancing around the issue, confront the reality of Islamic supremacism, and ensure that their counter-radicalization strategies are comprehensive and effective—not just limited to combating terrorism, but also addressing the broader ideological warfare that is being waged through social media and educational institutions.

The battle for ideological supremacy is being fought online, and if the West fails to engage with it, it risks allowing Islamic supremacist doctrines to quietly undermine the foundations of freedom, democracy, and secularism.

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