Refuting Islam

Critical Response to Contemporary Islam Revival, Political Islam, and the Challenges of the Modern World

A Polemical Deep Dive into the Islamic Response to Modernity (20th–21st Century)

Introduction: An Era of Revival or Regression?

The 20th and 21st centuries are often hailed by Islamic thinkers as a time of “awakening,” “revival,” or tajdīd—a return to the perceived purity and wholeness of the Islamic order. This narrative presents Islam not as a faith adapting to modernity, but as a totalizing system reasserting its divine claim over every sphere of human life—political, legal, cultural, and personal. But to critically examine this return is to ask: has the modern Islamic resurgence resolved the tension between divine absolutism and pluralistic modernity—or has it deepened it? Beneath the slogans of “justice,” “sovereignty of God,” and “Islamic identity” lies a persistent dilemma: Islam’s self-proclaimed comprehensiveness (shumūl) conflicts directly with the very structure of the modern world.

I. The Muslim Brotherhood and the Rebirth of the Theocratic Ideal

The Muslim Brotherhood’s creation in 1928 marks a pivotal point in Islam’s political self-conception: no longer a dormant religious tradition, but an activist ideology capable of reclaiming state power. Hassan al-Banna’s call for Sharīʿah governance was not a spiritual reform—he sought a political transformation to erase the secular modern state and rebuild an Islamic order from Qur’an and Sunnah.

Core Flaw: The assumption that Islam once governed every aspect of life flawlessly and can do so again. This is a mythologized vision of history—conflating the moral authority of revelation with the practical mechanisms of governance. Pre-modern Islamic polities were often despotic, fractured, and deeply embedded in tribal and dynastic conflict. The claim that a return to "divine rule" solves social decay is historically unsubstantiated.

Sayyid Qutb’s radicalization of the Brotherhood took this premise further—equating secular governance with Jāhiliyyah (pagan ignorance) and legitimizing the overthrow of Muslim governments. This is not a reform movement; it is a call for ideological theocracy through slow or sudden revolution. His use of Qur’an 5:44 is selective and absolutist—ignoring Qur’anic nuance, historical context, and the plurality of Islamic jurisprudence.

Logical Issue: If any departure from divine law renders a system kāfir, then almost every state—including early Islamic ones—would qualify as apostate. This logic collapses under its own weight.

II. The Iranian Revolution: A Shi’a Theocracy in a Sunni World

Khomeini’s 1979 revolution presented a Shīʿa answer to Sunni revivalism, but its fundamental claim is identical: Islam is a complete system, and modern secularism is not just a political error—it is a spiritual perversion. The doctrine of Wilāyat al-Faqīh arrogated authority to clerics in a way never historically practiced during the long occultation of the Twelfth Imam. This was not the natural evolution of Shīʿa theology, but a radical reinterpretation serving political ends.

Contradiction: Shīʿa tradition had historically avoided direct political rule in the absence of the Imam. Khomeini overturned centuries of Shīʿa restraint. The revolution reimagined history to justify clerical dictatorship while dressing it in religious garb.

Furthermore, appeals to Qur’an 33:6 (about the Prophet's authority) stretch meaning to imply legitimacy of current jurists—when the verse clearly addresses the Prophet’s unique, unrepeatable role. To draw a straight theological line from Muhammad to a contemporary Ayatollah is a category error.

III. Salafi-Jihadism: A Doctrine of Nihilism Masquerading as Purity

Groups like al-Qaeda and ISIS are often described as “misappropriating Islam.” But a more honest assessment shows their ideological foundations—though extremist—are rooted in orthodox interpretations of Tawḥīd and ḥākimiyyah (God’s sole right to legislate), especially from sources like Ibn Taymiyyah and Muhammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb.

Core Argument: The legitimacy of violence arises from the claim that secular rulers have nullified their Islam by failing to govern according to Sharīʿah. Takfīr becomes both a theological and political weapon.

Yet this exposes a deeper issue: Islam’s own framework provides the logic for totalism. The Qur’an, Hadith, and classical jurisprudence all contain ample fuel for theological exclusivism, legal absolutism, and militant enforcement. That ISIS quotes Qur’an 60:4 or enforces al-walā’ wa-l-barā’ is not a distortion—it is an amplification of latent impulses within Islamic orthodoxy.

IV. Islamic Law in the Modern Nation-State: Between Dogma and Dysfunction

While movements like the Brotherhood or the Taliban clamor for full Islamic law, nation-states have struggled with the selective, incoherent implementation of Sharīʿah. Saudi Arabia applies it to criminal law while preserving monarchy and corruption; Pakistan uses it to persecute minorities; Iran wraps it in clerical authoritarianism.

Apostasy and Blasphemy Laws: Qur’an 33:57 and Hadith like Bukhari 6922 are used to enforce death for dissent. These are not fringe rulings—they are the historical consensus of the schools of law. To defend such rulings today is to confess Islam’s incompatibility with basic human freedom.

Gender Inequality: Qur’an 4:11 (inheritance) and 2:282 (testimony) enshrine structural bias against women. Defenses based on “wisdom” or “complementarity” do not erase the core inequality—they only reframe it.

Maqāṣid al-sharīʿah (higher objectives of the law) is invoked by modernists to blunt the edge of these rules, but it is a reformist tool without authoritative mandate. The Qur’an and Sunnah do not provide legal override clauses. Therefore, reformists are, by traditional standards, engaging in heretical innovation (bid‘ah).

V. Islam and Pluralism: Theocratic Absolutism or Ethical Universality?

The tension between verses like Qur’an 2:62 (pluralistic) and 3:85 (exclusive) reflects the internal incoherence of the Qur’anic message regarding salvation and other religions. Apologists harmonize them with difficulty—asserting that 2:62 applied to “true followers” before Islam, and 3:85 supersedes all.

Historical reality: Dhimmitude was not tolerance—it was subjugation. Jews and Christians were not equals, but tolerated inferiors. The jizya was a humiliation tax, not a symbol of coexistence.

Modern contradiction: Islam demands freedom to practice and preach globally, while denying the same within its domain. In many Muslim-majority countries, conversion from Islam is illegal, missionary work is criminalized, and criticism of Muhammad is punishable by death. This is not a double standard—it is systemic religious supremacy.

VI. Modern Islam's Dilemma: A System at War with the Modern World

Contemporary Islamic revivalism, whether through state power, grassroots activism, or violent rebellion, consistently appeals to the same foundation: Islam is not just a religion—it is a system.

But this system is fundamentally incompatible with the modern ideals of pluralism, individual freedom, gender equality, and universal human rights.

It cannot tolerate apostasy, because it is built on political theology.
It cannot embrace secular law, because divine legislation is central to its identity.
It cannot accept equality between Muslims and non-Muslims, because Islam rests on its own finality and superiority.
It cannot reform its most problematic laws, without undermining its claims to divine origin.

Conclusion: The Crisis is Not Just in Practice—It Is in Principle

Revivalist Islam is not misapplying tradition—it is faithfully implementing it. The tension with the modern world is not a result of misunderstanding or bad actors, but of a deep structural incompatibility between Islamic absolutism and secular pluralism.

What remains is this: Modern Islam must either renounce its totalizing claims or continue clashing with the world it seeks to dominate. There is no middle ground between a revealed legal-political system and the pluralistic, rights-based order of the modern nation-state.

Until this internal reckoning occurs, Islam’s claim to offer a “complete system” will continue to fuel theological extremism, social repression, and global conflict—not peace, progress, or coexistence.

References

The Qur’an (Sahih International)
Ibn Kathīr, Tafsīr al-Qur’ān al-ʿAẓīm
Al-Ṭabāṭabā’ī, Tafsīr al-Mīzān
Sahih al-Bukhārī, 6922
Muhammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb, Kitāb al-Tawḥīd
Sayyid Qutb, Maʿālim fī al-Ṭarīq
Noah Feldman, The Fall and Rise of the Islamic State
Ayaan Hirsi Ali, Heretic: Why Islam Needs a Reformation Now